---
title: "Managerial Entrenchment and Valuation Effects of Toehold Acquisitions"
document_role: "보고서 원문"
language: "ko"
published: "2007-06-11"
authors:
  - "빈기범"
  - "윤정선"
description: "This paper examines the market reactions to toehold acquisitions to determine whether and under what circumstances the formation of a new large outside shareholder contributes to the value of the"
canonical_url: "https://www.kcmi.re.kr/report/report_view?report_no=168"
subjects:
  - "자본시장"
  - "금융산업"
---

# Managerial Entrenchment and Valuation Effects of Toehold Acquisitions

[뷰어](https://www.kcmi.re.kr/flexer/view?fid=4782&fgu=002002&fty=004003)
[원글](https://www.kcmi.re.kr/report/report_view?report_no=168)
## Page 1

Managerial Entrenchment and Valuation Effects of
                            Toehold Acquisitions



                           Ki Beom Binh∗, Jeongsun Yun∗∗




                                        Abstract

This paper examines the market reactions to toehold acquisitions to determine whether
and under what circumstances the formation of a new large outside shareholder
contributes to the value of the firm. We argue that although toehold acquisitions signal
imminent challenges to the control of the management of the target firms, the
challenges do not necessarily contribute to increasing shareholder value if the
management resists ferociously. We find that while voting premium increases in
response to toehold acquisitions for the entire sample, it depends on firm characteristics
such as dual class stocks and the asset size whether shareholder value increases or not.
Dual-class targets exhibit a positive market reaction only if the controlling shareholders
do not have sufficient corporate resources under their control, whereas single-class
targets show a significantly positive cumulative abnormal return regardless of the asset
size. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that dual-class stocks are an
outcome of the managerial incentives for entrenchment.




JEL classification: G32, G34

Keywords: event study; toehold acquisitions; agency theory; entrenchment; voting
premium; control transfer; managerial resistance; dual-class stocks; preferred stocks



∗
  Research Fellow, Korea Securities Research Institute, 45-2 Yoido-dong, Youngdeungpo-gu,
Seoul, 150-974, Korea; E-mail: bink1@ksri.org
∗∗
   Corresponding author. Research Fellow, Korea Securities Research Institute, 45-2 Yoido-
dong, Youngdeungpo-gu, Seoul, 150-974, Korea; Tel: +82-2-3771-0693; Fax: +82-2-786-7572;
E-mail: jyun@ksri.org

## Page 2

I. Introduction


   A dual-class firm is featured by i) a lower stock price relative to a single class firm

given earnings and sales (Smart and Zutter, 2003) and ii) the voting premium of its high

voting shares relative to the low voting shares (Zingales, 1995). Agency theory

considers both the discount of the stock price of the dual-class firm and the voting

premium as evidence that management attempts to secure private benefits by

maintaining sufficient control rights without corresponding capital investment

(DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1988).


   This paper provides empirical analyses on the market reactions to the formation of a

new large outside block to determine the effects of the changes in the ownership

structure on the voting premium and the shareholder value. The baseline assumption is

that management enjoys private benefits as a consequence of imperfect investor

protection. Toeholders are expected to enhance shareholder protection by challenging

the managerial control rights. It is more likely that the inefficient management is ousted

and that the managerial private benefits are purchased (Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer,

1999; Burkart, 1995; Choi, 1991; Rydqvist, 1996; Singh 1998).


   We examine whether the likelihood of the control contests is affected by the

ownership structure and under what circumstances the anticipation of subsequent

control contests increases the shareholder value. We expect that toehold events will

increase the voting premium if they are a precursor of imminent challenges to the

managerial control rights, whereas comparative analyses are required to determine their

effects on the stock price. We argue that dual-class targets may not exhibit the same

market reactions as single-class targets if issuing low voting shares represent the

                                             1

## Page 3

managerial incentives for entrenchment. Since dual-class stocks are an outcome of the

managerial incentives for entrenchment, the management issuing dual-class stocks are

expected to resist in the control contest more ferociously. We investigate whether and

under what circumstances the market reactions to toehold acquisitions depend on the

managerial incentives for entrenchment.


   Our tests are based on the analyses of responses of the stock price and the voting

premium to the formation of a large outside shareholder with activism purpose. The

analyses proceed in three steps. Firstly, we compute cumulative abnormal returns of the

target stocks during the period around disclosure of the acquisition of 5% or more of

the ownership of a firm to determine whether toehold acquisitions have any effects on

the sock price. Secondly, we investigate whether there is any change in the voting

premium during the same period to determine the effect of changes in the ownership

structure on the anticipation of the control contests. Finally, we provide comparative

analyses to examine whether and how the stock market reactions to toehold acquisitions

depend on the target characteristics.


   The principal observation of our paper is that toehold acquisitions by activist

acquirers increase the likelihood of control contests, while their valuation effects

depend on firm characteristics regarding managerial entrenchment. The positive

response of the voting premium to toehold acquisitions provides a dynamic extension to

Rydqvist (1996), who finds that the voting premium increases as the ownership is

concentrated among a few competing large investors. This is also consistent with Choi

(1991) who suggests that positive market reactions to toehold acquisitions are a

consequence of the anticipation of the subsequent control-related events.



                                             2

## Page 4

First of all, we find a substantial increase in the voting premium during the period

around toehold acquisitions. The positive response of the voting premium to toehold

acquisitions is consistent with the hypothesis that takeovers are more likely to take

place in the presence of toeholders. We find, however, that dual-class targets fail to

exhibit a positive cumulative abnormal return if the controlling shareholders have large

assets under its control while single-class targets do exhibit a significantly positive

cumulative abnormal return regardless of the asset size. The interaction effect between

the asset size and the dual-class stocks on the market reaction to toehold acquisitions

remains robust after controlling for other factors such as the ownership of the

controlling shareholder and the capital structure of the targets. The interaction effect is

consistent with the hypothesis that the dual-class stocks are a means for managerial

entrenchment. Since the management with many corporate resources under its control

can resist more effectively, the management with incentives for entrenchment is more

likely to succeed in fending off takeover attempts with more corporate resources under

its control.1


    Our paper is closely related with research on market reactions to toehold

acquisitions. Choi (1991) and Park, Selvili, and Song (2006) document that positive

abnormal increases of the target stock price of follow toehold acquisitions. The former

emphasizes that the positive market reactions are a consequence of the anticipation of

the subsequent control-related events, while the latter focus on the comparative

analyses on how the target characteristics such as the managerial ownership are related

with market reactions to determine the effects of the monitoring of a large shareholder


1
  The payment of greenmails is an example of the use of the corporate resources for a value-
destroying defense.


                                               3

## Page 5

on the shareholder value.


    An innovation of our research is to take into consideration agency costs approaches

to the dual-class stocks in analyzing the market reactions to toehold acquisitions. In

section IV, we argue that the positive response of the voting premium to toehold

acquisitions is the consequence of an increase in the probability of the control contests.

The interaction effect between the asset size and the dual-class stocks suggests that the

managerial incentives for entrenchment deter value-enhancing control transfers if the

management has sufficient resources under its control.


    We depend on models of how the ownership distribution of target firms affects the

outcome of the control contests to argue that the voting premium and the shareholder

value are the consequence of the anticipation of the subsequent control-related events.

Grossman and Hart (1980) show that toeholds enable the bidders to profitably acquire

the target company even if the free-riding by atomic shareholders prevent them from

profitably acquiring the rest of shares needed to take over the control rights.2 They

argue that this is because the costs of takeovers are compensated by the gains from the

shares that they have already acquired. Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer (1999), Burkart

(1995) and Singh (1998) show that toeholders tend to bid more aggressively than non-

toeholders since a part or all of the loss from having to acquire the firm at a higher price

is compensated by the higher selling price when they lose the contest. Rydqvist (1996)

documents that the presence of a large outside shareholder tends to increase voting

premium since the contests for control are more likely. Our analyses of the voting

2
  The property of the free-rider problem in takeover contests is that the costs of corporate
takeovers cannot be compensated by the synergy of acquisition, since atomic shareholders will
not tender their shares until they are paid the same amount as their shares will be worth once
acquisition is completed.


                                               4

## Page 6

premium provide a dynamic extension to the hypothesis that the voting rights will be

more expensive as the concentration of corporate ownership among a few large

shareholders will enhance the anticipation of control contests.


   Finally, our specification of the voting premium is based on Zingales (1995), who

suggests that the voting premium is a function of the managerial private benefits and

the probability that the private benefits are traded in the control market. On the basis of

this specification of the voting premium, we argue that toehold acquisitions tend to

increase the voting premium since the control transfers are more likely to take place in

the presence of a large outside block.


   The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the principal

hypotheses that we test and section III provides the description of the sample data.

Section IV reports the results of the empirical analyses. Section V concludes the paper.




                     II. Hypotheses Development and Test Design


   We consider a management of a firm issuing preferred stocks without voting rights

to consolidate control rights in its hand without corresponding capital investment. The

baseline assumption is that it is not in the best interest of the incumbent management or

the controlling shareholder to maximize the shareholder value of the firm. We focus on

analyzing the influences of toehold acquisitions on the shareholder value and the voting

premium to determine whether and under what circumstances the challenges to the

managerial control rights imposed by toehold acquisitions contribute to the shareholder




                                             5

## Page 7

value.


   We follow earlier works to define voting premium in terms of the managerial

private benefits and the likelihood of control contests. Rydqvist (1996) assumes that the

cash flow of a firm is composed of the fundamental value that the management cannot

steal and the private benefits obtainable only by the controlling management. While the

price of a non-voting share is determined only by the fundamental value, that of a

voting share reflects the value of the managerial private benefits, as well as the

fundamental value. Zingales (1995) considers the size of the voting premium as a

function of the probability that a vote is pivotal in a control contest and the magnitude

of the managerial private benefits. More specifically, the voting premium increases as

the probability of the control contests increases for given private benefits.


   We expect that the voting premium will increase in response to toehold acquisitions

since control contests are more likely to occur. Models of takeover contests emphasize

that toehold strategies facilitate value-enhancing takeovers. Grossman and Hart (1980)

show that toeholders are compensated for a part of or all takeover costs by the increase

in the stock price for the shares that they have already acquired. As a consequence,

takeovers may take place even if free-riding by atomic shareholders prevents the bidder

from acquiring the rest of shares to take over the control of the target firms in a

profitable manner. Furthermore, Burkart (1995), Singh (1998) and Bulow, Huang, and

Klemperer (1999) show that toeholders are prone to bidding aggressively in the control

contest relative to non-toeholders since the loss from an increase in the takeover price is

at least partially compensated by an increase in the selling price in the event that the

firm is acquired by a competing bidder. The aggressive bidding by toeholders increases



                                             6

## Page 8

the likelihood that the managerial private benefits are purchased or that an inefficient

management is ousted. As a consequence, the presence of a large shareholder tends to

increase the voting premium for given managerial private benefits as well as the stock

price at which the firm is traded.


     We furthermore examine whether and under what circumstances the managerial

incentives for entrenchment affect market reactions to toehold acquisitions. We expect

that dual-class firms will exhibit different market reactions to toehold acquisitions from

single-class firms as long as the managerial incentives for entrenchment can deter

control transfers. Since agency costs approaches to the dual class stocks suggests that

the management uses the dual-class stocks to protect its private benefits, the

management of a dual-class firm is expected to resist takeover attempts more

ferociously. We first compare CARs for targets with and those without dual-class stocks.

Then, we proceed to take into consideration other factors that may affect managerial

resistance. In particular, we focus on the analysis of an interaction effect between the

dual-class stocks and the asset size on the market reaction to toehold acquisitions, since

the managerial resistance may be more effective as the corporate resources under the

control of the management increase. Models of control contests emphasize that the

managerial resistance may incur a trade-off for the share price at which the firm is

traded in the market for control. While the managerial resistance makes takeovers less

likely to take place, the takeover premium that the target shareholders can capture

increases as the managerial bargaining power increases.3 We expect an interference

interaction effect between the asset size and the dual-class stocks if the managerial



3
    See Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) for a detailed description of the trade-off.


                                                   7

## Page 9

resistance reduces the stock price.4




                                 III. Data and Methodology


    A. The Sample of Toehold Acquisitions


    Our analyses are based on the sample of toehold acquisitions reported to the Korea

Financial Supervisory Service (hereafter KFSS) according to the requirement of the

disclosure of the acquisition of a block ownership of 5% or more for a listed firm.5 The

data we use was collected by the KFSS. It covers all toehold acquisitions of the firms

listed in the Korea Exchange (hereafter KRX) since January 2001. Although KRX is

composed of Korea Stock Market Division and Korea Kosdaq Market Division, we

only use data on the firms listed in the Korea Stock Market Division since firms listed

in the Korea Kosdaq Market Division do not have outstanding dual-class stocks.

Furthermore, we confine our analyses to events for the years from 2003 to 2006.6


    The following sample selection criteria are applied: (i) targets of common stock

acquisitions with initial 5% disclosure filings, not the additional disclosure due to the

change over 1% following initial disclosure; (ii) targets whose common stock prices

and old style preferred stock prices, if dual-class stocks issued, are available for the


4
  The interference interaction effect between two variables means that the effect of one variable
decreases for higher levels of the other variable.
5
  A purchaser of a block ownership of 5% or more for a listed firm is required to report to
KFSS within 5 days following the acquisitions.
6
  The rationale for our choice of this period for the analyses is based on the fact that the use of
the toehold strategy by Sovereign fund to impose a credible threat on the control rights of the
incumbent management of SK group and SK corp. in 2003 brought home the importance of the
toehold strategy to the Korean market for the control.


                                                 8

## Page 10

event window [-100, 100]; (iii) targets whose stock prices and old style preferred stock

prices, if dual-class stocks issued, are available for at least 30 days prior to the event

window.7 Common stock prices and preferred stock prices used in our study are from

the KRX database whose frequency is daily base.


    The data is composed of 1,523 observations of toehold acquisitions that satisfy the

criteria described above. We classify the sample according to the purpose of toehold

acquisitions and the characteristics of the target companies such as the dual-class stocks

and the asset size. Table I shows that among 1,523 observations of toehold acquisitions,

238 targets have dual-class stocks outstanding and 1,285 targets do not. Only the

observations with dual-class stocks can be used in the analyses of voting premium.

Table I also shows that 720 of total observations are for investment purposes and 166

for activism purposes. The purpose of acquisitions of the remaining 637 observations is

unknown. Another characteristic of the target firms that we consider is the size of the

assets under the control of the incumbent management or the controlling shareholder.


    The targets affiliated with a conglomerate with assets worth 2 trillion Korean won

or more and controlled by family owner are classified under Large Group and the rest

under Small Group.8 Table I shows that of the 166 observations of activism purpose,

13 belong to the Large Group and 135 to the Small Group in target without dual-class

stock sample. It also shows that of 18 targets with dual-class stocks outstanding, 7

belong to the Large Group and 11 to the Small Group.


7
  We use the common stock price and the old style stock price data in the voting premium
analyses. By an old style preferred stock, we mean a preferred stock which provides only
dividend rights.
8
  Two trillion Korean won is the threshold level of the asset size employed by the Korean Fair
Trade Commission (hereafter KFTC) to determine various regulations for so-called chaebols.


                                               9

## Page 11

Table I
                   Classification of 1,523 toehold acquisition observations
The table classifies the observations of toehold acquisitions on the basis of the purpose of
toehold acquisitions, the size of the assets under the control of the management or the
controlling shareholder, and whether target has the dual-class stocks outstanding.
                     Targets with dual-class stocks          Targets without dual-class
                                                                       stocks               Total
                      Large Group        Small Group      Large Group       Small Group
   Investment               65                 71              115              469          720
     purpose
Activism purpose             7                 11               13              135          166
Unknown purpose             47                 37              110              443          637

      Total                119                119              238             1,047        1,523




B. Stock price response analysis


    We use the event study methodology to carry out our analyses. The event day is the

date on which the acquisition of a block ownership of 5% or more is reported to KFSS.

We compute the abnormal return of a target stock in terms of the residual defined by the

actual rate of return less than the rate of return predicted by the market model:


                   ARiτ = Riτ − αˆ i − βˆi RMτ ,                                            (1)


where ARiτ denotes the daily abnormal return of stock i at date τ relative to the

event date, Riτ and RMτ the logarithmic daily return of stock i and KOSPI index,

respectively. α̂ i and β̂ i denote OLS estimates of the market model of stock i over

the period of 250 trading days prior to the event window.9 The cumulative abnormal

9
  For the observations whose lengths of the stock price data for the pre-event period are less
than 250 days, the market models are estimated with only available data. Those observations


                                                    10

## Page 12

return for stock i over the subinterval [τ 1 ,τ 2 ] in the event window is the sum of the

abnormal returns over that interval:


                                       τ2
                  CARi [τ 1 ,τ 2 ] = ∑ ARiτ .                                          (2)
                                      τ =τ 1




The standard errors of the above abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return can

be computed based on Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997).




C. Voting premium response analysis


    We compute abnormal changes in the voting premium to analyze the responses of

the voting premium to the formation of a new outside large block. We define the voting

premium to be the logarithmic difference between the common stock price and the

preferred stock price without voting rights:


                                  [                               ]
                  VPiτ = 100 × ln( Piτcommon ) − ln( Piτpreferred ) ,                  (3)



where VPiτ denotes the voting premium of stock i at date τ and Piτcommon and

Piτpreferred the common stock price and the old style preferred stock price, respectively.


    Let ∆VPiτ denote the daily change of the voting premium for stock i at date τ

given by




with the length of less than 30 days are removed from the sample.


                                                    11

## Page 13

∆VPiτ = VPiτ − VPi ,τ −1 .                                              (4)


We define the abnormal daily change of the voting premium to be the daily change of

the voting premium less than average daily change of the voting premium over the

estimation period:10


                  ∆VPiτ* = ∆VPiτ − ∆VPi ,                                                 (5)



where ∆VPiτ* denotes the abnormal daily change of the voting premium of firm i at


date τ , and ∆VPi the average voting premium change over the period of 250 trading

days prior to the event window.11 Furthermore, we define the cumulative abnormal

change of voting premium for stock i over the interval [τ 1 ,τ 2 ] within the event

window to be the sum of the daily abnormal change of the voting premium over the

interval:


                                      τ2
                  C∆VPi *[τ 1 ,τ 2 ] = ∑ ∆VPiτ* .                                         (6)
                                     τ =τ1




The standard error of C∆VPi *[τ 1 ,τ 2 ] is computed with a modification of Campbell, Lo,

and MacKinlay (1997).




10
   Note that the unit of the abnormal change of the voting premium is % point, not %.
11
   The average is taken over available data if the changes in voting premium are available only
for the period with less than 250 days but more than 30 days.


                                                    12

## Page 14

IV. Empirical Results

    A. Market reactions to toehold acquisitions

    Figure 1 exhibits average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR, hereafter) for the

window [-100, t ] for the samples of investment purpose and activism purpose,

respectively. Targets of investment purpose toehold acquisitions fail to exhibit a

significant cumulative abnormal return for the entire period, although there are some

periods within which ACAR looks significant. To the contrary, targets of activism

purpose toehold acquisitions exhibit significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns

for the most of the period. The ACAR steadily increases until 10 days after the

disclosure and reaches a plateau thereafter. The ACAR for the entire period in event

window amounts to about 28%.



                                           35
                                                              investment purpose
                                                              activist purpose
                                           30



                                           25
          cumulative abnormal return (%)




                                           20



                                           15



                                           10



                                            5



                                            0



                                            -5



                                           -10
                                                 -100
                                                        -95
                                                        -90
                                                        -85
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                                                                                                      65
                                                                                                      70
                                                                                                      75
                                                                                                      80
                                                                                                      85
                                                                                                      90
                                                                                                      95
                                                                                                           100




Figure 1. ACARs of targets of toehold acquisitions for activism purpose and investment
purpose. The figure presents the average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) of targets for
activism purpose and investment purpose, respectively.




                                                                                            13

## Page 15

Table II investigates the ACARs for the pre-event, around the event, and post-event

periods as well as the entire period of the event window. ACARs of the targets of the

activism purpose acquisitions are found significantly positive for the pre-event and the

around event periods. The results reinforce the findings by Choi (1991) and Park, Selvili,

and Song (2006), who report positive market reactions to toehold acquisitions with an

activism purpose.12




12
  Unlike Choi (1991), who reports a negative pre-toehold abnormal return, we find positive
abnormal returns for the pre-event periods.


                                             14

## Page 16

Table II

ACARs of targets of toehold acquisitions for activism purpose and investment purpose for
                                                   various periods
  The table presents the ACARs for targets of toehold acquisition for the pre-event period,
  around event period, and post-event period as well as for the entire period. t-values are in
                   *** **           *
  parentheses.       ,      , and       denote the statistical significance at the two-sided 1%, 5%, and
  10% levels, respectively.
                                                ACAR for Activism              ACAR for Investment
           Time period                          Purpose Sample (%)             Purpose Sample (%)
                                                [Sample Size=166]               [Sample Size=720]
      Panel A. Pre-event period
                                                        ***                             ***
                                                            15.98                          5.45
      [-100, -10]
                                                           (4.56)                        (4.05)
                                                          ***                           ***
                                                              5.92                         2.24
      [-10, -1]
                                                           (5.85)                        (5.77)
                                                        ***                             ***
                                                            21.77                          7.55
      [-100, -1]
                                                           (5.84)                        (5.28)
      Panel B. Around event period
                                                         ***                                 *
                                                             1.74                          0.33
      [-1, 0]
                                                          (3.91)                         (1.91)
                                                         ***
                                                             0.91                          0.04
      [0, 0]
                                                          (2.89)                         (0.31)
                                                         ***
                                                             2.32                          0.04
      [0, 1]
                                                          (5.22)                         (0.21)
                                                         ***
                                                             3.16                          0.33
      [-1, 1]
                                                          (5.78)                         (1.55)
      Panel C. Post-event period
                                                         ***                             *
                                                            2.85                           -0.74
      [1, 10]
                                                          (2.82)                        (-1.91)
                                                                                      ***
                                                            1.84                          -11.66
      [10, 100]
                                                          (0.52)                         (-8.65)
                                                                                      ***
                                                            5.30                         -12.18
      [1, 100]
                                                          (1.42)                        (-8.51)
      Panel D. Entire period
                                                        ***                             **
                                                           27.98                          -4.60
      [-100, 100]
                                                          (4.65)                        (-1.99)
                                                        ***
                                                           15.10                          -0.27
      [-50, 50]
                                                          (4.02)                        (-0.19)



   Figure 2 and Table III examine whether the voting premium exhibit abnormal

changes in response to toehold acquisitions. The average cumulative abnormal changes

in the voting premium (ACA∆VP, hereafter) of the targets in the activism sample

increases steadily during the entire period of the event window, while that of the targets



                                                          15

## Page 17

in the investment sample remains unchanged. For the activism sample, the ACA∆VP for

the window [-100, 100] reaches about 30 % p and is significant at 5% level.



                                                            35
                                                                              investment purpose
                                                                              activist purpose

                                                            30
          cumulative abnormal voting premium change (% p)




                                                            25



                                                            20



                                                            15



                                                            10



                                                            5



                                                            0



                                                            -5
                                                                 -100
                                                                 -95
                                                                        -90
                                                                        -85
                                                                        -80
                                                                              -75
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                                                                                                                              20
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                                                                                                                              30
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                                                                                                                                             60
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                                                                                                                                                  70
                                                                                                                                                  75
                                                                                                                                                       80
                                                                                                                                                       85
                                                                                                                                                       90
                                                                                                                                                       95
                                                                                                                                                            100
Figure 2. ACA∆VP of targets of toehold acquisitions for activism purpose and investment
purpose. The figure presents the average cumulative abnormal voting premium change
(ACA∆VP) of targets for activism purpose and investment purpose, respectively. The ACA∆VP
can be computed only for the firms with dual-class stocks outstanding.




                                                                                                                 16

## Page 18

Table III

ACA∆VPs of targets of toehold acquisitions for activism purpose and investment purpose
                                       for various periods
  The table presents the ACA∆VPs for targets of toehold acquisition for the pre-event period,
  around the event period, the post-event period as well as for the entire period. t-values are
  in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the two-sided 1%, 5%, and
  10% levels, respectively.
                                        ACA∆VP of Activist             ACA∆VP of Investment
               Time Period             Purpose Sample (% p)             Purpose Sample (% p)
                                         [sample size=18]                [sample size=136]
  Panel A. Pre-event period
                                                  12.29                             2.53
     [-100, -10]
                                                 (1.47)                           (0.87)
                                                   0.77                            -0.61
     [-10, -1]
                                                 (0.32)                          (-0.72)
                                                  13.24                             1.87
     [-100, -1]
                                                 (1.49)                           (0.60)
  Panel B. Around event period
                                                    0.22                            0.27
     [-1, 0]
                                                  (0.21)                          (0.71)
                                                   -0.33                            0.23
     [0, 0]
                                                 (-0.44)                          (0.86)
                                                   -0.63                            0.30
     [0, 1]
                                                 (-0.59)                          (0.82)
                                                   -0.08                            0.34
     [-1, 1]
                                                 (-0.06)                          (0.75)
  Panel C. Post-event period
                                                    -0.57                           0.89
     [1, 10]
                                                 (-0.23)                          (1.05)
                                                  *
                                                   15.89                           -2.49
     [10, 100]
                                                  (1.90)                         (-0.85)
                                                  *
                                                    17.11                          -1.87
     [1, 100]
                                                  (1.92)                         (-0.60)
  Panel D. Entire period
                                                **
                                                  30.02                             0.23
     [-100, 100]
                                                 (2.10)                           (0.05)
                                                  10.71                             2.24
     [-50, 50]
                                                 (1.20)                           (0.72)


   The positive response of the voting premium to toehold acquisitions suggests that

the formation of a new large outside investor increases the likelihood that the firm will

undergo control-related events such as proxy fights. The results provide a dynamic

extension to Rydqvist (1996), who shows that the voting premium increases as the

ownership is concentrated among a few large shareholders. The results are also


                                                17

## Page 19

consistent with Choi (1991), who argues that positive market reactions to toehold

acquisitions reflect the anticipation of the subsequent control-related events.



    B. Firm characteristics and the valuation effects of toehold acquisitions

    This subsection analyzes whether target characteristics related with the managerial

entrenchment influence market reactions to toehold acquisitions. We first examine

whether the valuation effects of toehold acquisitions depend on the asset size, the dual-

class stocks and their interaction effects. In the following subsection, we proceed to

provide regression analysis to examine whether the results remain robust after

controlling for other factors that might affect the valuation effects of toehold

acquisitions.

    Figure 3 presents ACARs for targets of activism purpose acquisitions according to

the size of assets, i.e., Large vs. Small Group. They show that ACARs are significantly

positive for most sub-periods in the event window for both groups. Although the targets

in the Small Group appear to have a slightly higher ACAR than those in the Large

Group, the difference between two ACARs over the period [-100, 100] is not

statistically significant at 10% level.

    Figure 4 exhibits the ACARs of the targets with vs. without preferred stocks

outstanding, respectively. Again, we do not find a statistically meaningful difference

between the two groups.




                                             18

## Page 20

35
                                                               Small Group
                                                               Large Group

                                            30



                                            25
           cumulative abnormal return (%)




                                            20



                                            15



                                            10



                                            5



                                            0



                                            -5
                                                 -100
                                                 -95
                                                        -90
                                                        -85
                                                        -80
                                                              -75
                                                              -70
                                                                    -65
                                                                    -60
                                                                          -55
                                                                          -50
                                                                          -45
                                                                          -40
                                                                                      -35
                                                                                            -30
                                                                                            -25
                                                                                            -20
                                                                                                  -15
                                                                                                  -10
                                                                                                  -5
                                                                                                        0
                                                                                                            5
                                                                                                            10
                                                                                                            15
                                                                                                                 20
                                                                                                                 25
                                                                                                                 30
                                                                                                                      35
                                                                                                                           40
                                                                                                                           45
                                                                                                                           50
                                                                                                                           55
                                                                                                                                60
                                                                                                                                65
                                                                                                                                     70
                                                                                                                                     75
                                                                                                                                          80
                                                                                                                                          85
                                                                                                                                          90
                                                                                                                                          95
                                                                                                                                               100
Figure 3. ACARs of targets of toehold acquisitions for activism purpose in Large Group
vs. Small Group. The figure presents the ACARs of targets for activism purpose in Large
Group vs. Small Group, respectively.


                                            40
                                                              Targets with Preferred Stocks
                                                              Targets without Preferred Stocks
                                            35



                                            30
           cumulative abnormal return (%)




                                            25



                                            20



                                            15



                                            10



                                            5



                                            0



                                            -5
                                                 -100
                                                 -95
                                                        -90
                                                        -85
                                                        -80
                                                              -75
                                                              -70
                                                                    -65
                                                                    -60
                                                                          -55
                                                                          -50
                                                                          -45
                                                                          -40
                                                                                      -35
                                                                                            -30
                                                                                            -25
                                                                                            -20
                                                                                                  -15
                                                                                                  -10
                                                                                                  -5
                                                                                                        0
                                                                                                            5
                                                                                                            10
                                                                                                            15
                                                                                                                 20
                                                                                                                 25
                                                                                                                 30
                                                                                                                      35
                                                                                                                           40
                                                                                                                           45
                                                                                                                           50
                                                                                                                           55
                                                                                                                                60
                                                                                                                                65
                                                                                                                                     70
                                                                                                                                     75
                                                                                                                                          80
                                                                                                                                          85
                                                                                                                                          90
                                                                                                                                          95
                                                                                                                                               100




Figure 4. ACARs of targets of toehold acquisitions for activism purpose with vs. without
preferred stocks. The figure presents the ACARs of targets for activism purpose with vs.
without preferred stocks, respectively.




                                                                                                    19

## Page 21

Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the interaction effects between the size of the asset under

the control of management or controlling shareholder and the dual-class stocks. They

present a drastic difference in the market reactions depending on the size of the

corporate assets between targets with vs. without preferred stocks outstanding. Figure 5

shows that the stock price response does not depend on the size of the assets if target

companies do not have preferred stocks outstanding. On the other hand, Figure 6 shows

that the asset size makes a drastic difference in the market reactions to toehold

acquisitions of targets with preferred stocks outstanding. That is, while the stock prices

of the targets in Large Group do not respond to toehold acquisitions, those of the targets

in Small Group exhibit an immediate surge in response to the toehold acquisition

announcement.



                                            35
                                                               Small Group
                                                               Large Group
                                            30



                                            25
           cumulative abnormal return (%)




                                            20



                                            15



                                            10



                                             5



                                             0



                                             -5



                                            -10
                                                  -100
                                                         -95
                                                         -90
                                                         -85
                                                         -80
                                                               -75
                                                               -70
                                                               -65
                                                               -60
                                                               -55
                                                               -50
                                                               -45
                                                               -40
                                                               -35
                                                                             -30
                                                                             -25
                                                                             -20
                                                                             -15
                                                                             -10
                                                                             -5
                                                                             0
                                                                             5
                                                                             10
                                                                             15
                                                                             20
                                                                             25
                                                                             30
                                                                                   35
                                                                                   40
                                                                                   45
                                                                                   50
                                                                                   55
                                                                                   60
                                                                                   65
                                                                                   70
                                                                                   75
                                                                                   80
                                                                                   85
                                                                                   90
                                                                                   95
                                                                                        100




Figure 5. ACARs of targets of toehold acquisitions for activism purpose in Large Group vs.
Small Group: targets without preferred stocks. The figure presents the ACARs of targets for
activism purpose in Large Group vs. Small Group, respectively, that do not have preferred
stocks outstanding.




                                                                              20

## Page 22

60
                                                              Small Group
                                                              Large Group

                                           50




                                           40
          cumulative abnormal return (%)




                                           30




                                           20




                                           10




                                            0




                                           -10
                                                 -100
                                                        -95
                                                        -90
                                                        -85
                                                        -80
                                                              -75
                                                              -70
                                                              -65
                                                              -60
                                                              -55
                                                              -50
                                                              -45
                                                              -40
                                                              -35
                                                                            -30
                                                                            -25
                                                                            -20
                                                                            -15
                                                                            -10
                                                                            -5
                                                                            0
                                                                            5
                                                                            10
                                                                            15
                                                                            20
                                                                            25
                                                                            30
                                                                                  35
                                                                                  40
                                                                                  45
                                                                                  50
                                                                                  55
                                                                                  60
                                                                                  65
                                                                                  70
                                                                                  75
                                                                                  80
                                                                                  85
                                                                                  90
                                                                                  95
                                                                                       100
Figure 6. ACARs of targets of toehold acquisitions for activism purpose in Large Group vs.
Small Group: targets with preferred stocks. The figure presents the ACARs of targets for
activism purpose in Large Group vs. Small Group, respectively, that have preferred stocks
outstanding.



    Table IV provides more detailed analyses on the interaction effects between the

dual-class stocks and the asset size. Panel A in the table shows that while dual-class

targets in Small Group exhibit an immediate surge in ACARs following the disclosure

of toehold acquisitions, those in Large Group fail to exhibit a significant abnormal

return for any period. Panel B in the table, on the other hand, shows that targets in both

exhibit significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns and their difference do not

appear meaningful.




                                                                             21

## Page 23

Table IV

 ACARs of targets of toehold acquisitions for activism purpose in Large vs. Small Group
                              and with vs. without preferred stocks
  The table summarizes the ACARs for subintervals within the event window for the targets
  in Large vs. Small Group and with vs. without preferred stocks outstanding. t-values are in
  the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the two-sided 1%, 5%, and
  10% levels, respectively.
                                                       Large Group              Small Group
      Panel A. Targets with Preferred Stocks
                                                          2.76                       1.87
      ACAR[-100, -10]
                                                        (0.25)                    (0.19)
                                                          5.46                       4.82
      ACAR[-10, 10]
                                                        (1.15)                    (1.13)
                                                                                ***
                                                         -8.55                      44.34
      ACAR[10, 100]
                                                       (-0.77)                    (4.44)
                                                                                ***
                                                         -0.07                      55.32
      ACAR[-100, 100]
                                                       (-0.00)                    (3.25)
      Sample Size                                             7                        11

      Panel B. Targets without Preferred Stocks
                                                                                ***
                                                          13.97                     18.01
      ACAR [-100, -10]
                                                        (1.43)                    (4.40)
                                                         **                     ***
                                                            9.15                    10.34
      ACAR [-10, 10]
                                                        (2.19)                    (5.93)
                                                           7.69                     -1.65
      ACAR [10, 100]
                                                        (0.78)                   (-0.40)
                                                        *                       ***
                                                          30.61                     26.95
      ACAR [-100, 100]
                                                        (1.83)                    (3.84)
      Sample Size                                           13                        135




   C. Regression Analyses

   This subsection provides regression analyses on the market reactions after

controlling for other target characteristics such as the managerial ownership and the

capital structure that may affect the valuation consequences of toehold acquisitions. We

show that the interaction effects between the asset size and the dual class stocks remain

valid after controlling for those factors. The analyses are based on the following

regression models:



                                                  22

## Page 24

Model I: CAR[τ 1 ,τ 2 ] = α + β Dlarge + γ Dpreferred stock + δ ( Dlarge × Dpreferred stock ) + ξ         (7)

 Model II: CAR[τ 1 ,τ 2 ] = α + β Dlarge + γ Dpreferred stock + δ ( Dlarge × Dpreferred stock ) + φ ' z + η (8)

where Dlarge and Dpreferredstock are dummy variables that take 1 if the target is in Large

Group and if the target has the preferred stock, respectively, and 0 otherwise. z

denotes control variables. It includes the cross product of the dummy variable for the

preferred stock and the proportion of preferred stock, the ownership under the control of

the controlling shareholder, the logarithm of the target asset, and the leverage

ratio(=(total debt)/(total asset)).13 ξ and η are the disturbance terms.

     The main focus of the regression analysis is to see whether the coefficient δ is

significant. It reflects the interaction effect between the asset size and the dual-class

stocks on the market reactions to toehold acquisitions. We use the weighted least

squares (WLS) to estimate the models (7) and (8) considering the difference of the

precision of CAR of each firm. Model I specifies the interaction effects without

controlling for other factors that are potentially relevant while Model II takes into

consideration them.




13
   The data for these control variables are available at the DART (Data Analysis, Retrieval and
Transfer) System in KFSS.


                                                      23

## Page 25

Table V

                             Regression results using weighted least squares
  This table provides the estimation results of the regression (7) and (8). We use the weighted
  least squares (WLS) technique since the standard errors of the CARs of individual targets
  may be different. t-values are in the parentheses. *,           **
                                                                       , and   ***
                                                                                     denote the statistical
  significance at the two-sided 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

                                                   CAR[10, 100]                         CAR[-100, 100]
          Dependent variable
                                              Model I        Model II                Model I        Model II
                                                               ***
                                                      9.62          22.89                   -8.41           18.62
                   Dlarge
                                                    (1.19)         (2.69)                 (-0.61)          (1.28)
                                               ***            ***                     ***            ***
                                                   133.62         160.20                  130.62         167.83
               Dpreferred stock
                                                  (15.37)         (11.12)                  (8.80)          (6.82)
                                              ***            ***                     ***            ***
                                                 -149.28         -165.74                 -152.37        -177.20
           Dlarge×Dpreferred stock
                                                   (-9.70)     (-10.24)                   (-5.79)        (-6.40)
             Dpreferred stock×                          ⎯            -1.86                     ⎯            -2.30
     (preferred share proportion)                                 (-1.46)                                (-1.06)
                                                                 ***                                    ***
   ownership under the control of the                   ⎯           -0.60                      ⎯            -1.00
       controlling shareholder                                    (-3.34)                                (-3.22)
                                                                 ***                                    ***
                                                        ⎯           -3.83                      ⎯            -8.63
                Ln(asset)
                                                                  (-4.82)                                (-6.35)
                                                                                                         *
                                                        ⎯          -22.64                      ⎯          -43.60
                Leverage
                                                                  (-1.63)                                (-1.84)
              Sample size                            166               166                  166             166




   Table V provides the regression results. The coefficient δ , which represents the

interaction effect between the asset size and the dual-class stocks, is found to be

negative and statistically highly significant in both Model I and Model II for both CAR

from 10 to 100 and CAR in the entire period. These results suggest that the managerial

incentives for entrenchment tend to reduce the likelihood for takeovers to take place if

the management has sufficient assets under its control. The results are consistent with

the agency costs approach to the dual-class stocks. Since dual-class stocks are an

outcome of the managerial incentives for entrenchment, the management issuing dual-

class stocks is expected to resist more ferociously against control transfers. The

managerial resistance is more successful as the corporate resources under the control of


                                                   24

## Page 26

the management or the controlling shareholder increase only for the targets with

preferred stocks outstanding.

     The results also have an implication for controversies regarding the effects of the

managerial resistance against takeover attempts on the shareholder value. Models of

takeover contests argue that the managerial resistance causes a trade-off for the

expected value of the takeover premium that target shareholders can capture. The

property of the trade-off is that the managerial resistance reduces the likelihood for the

takeover to take place on the one hand, and increases the takeover premium that the

target shareholders can capture on the other hand. As a consequence, the effect of the

managerial resistance on the expected value of the takeover premium remains

indeterminate ex ante and, as a result, it is a matter of empirical investigation whether

managerial resistance contributes to the shareholder value. Our empirical results,

however, are not consistent with the trade-off hypothesis. Rather, the surge of the stock

price of the dual-class targets in Small Group in contrast to a meager response of that of

the dual-class targets in Large Group may be considered as evidence that the managerial

resistance is in fact harmful to the shareholder value.

     It is also worth noting that the stock price does not exhibit a significant increase for

targets in Large Group if they have preferred stocks outstanding while their voting

premium does increase.14 This implies that the management is expected to use the

corporate resources to defend its control rights through the value-destroying defensive

tactics such as, for example, the payment of greenmails.




14
   We find that the voting premium increases regardless of the size of assets although we do not
report the results.


                                              25

## Page 27

V. Summary and Conclusion


    Previous studies on toehold acquisitions emphasize that a large outside block

provides challenges to the managerial control rights and more efficient monitoring. As a

consequence, toehold acquisitions are followed by substantial increases in the

shareholder value. This paper extends previous studies by examining whether the

likelihood of the control contests is affected by the ownership structure and under what

circumstances the anticipation of subsequent control contests increases the shareholder

value of the target company.


    We first find that the voting premium increases in response to toehold acquisitions,

which is consistent with the hypothesis that toehold acquisitions signal imminent

challenges to the control of the management of the target firms. To the contrary, the

stock price exhibits an interaction effect between the asset size and the dual-class stocks.

The property of the interaction effect is that the valuation effects of toehold acquisitions

of dual-class targets depend negatively on the size of assets under the control of the

controlling shareholders, whereas those of single-class targets remain independent of

the asset size. In particular, it turns out that dual-class targets fail to exhibit positive

cumulative abnormal returns if the controlling shareholders have sufficient corporate

resources for resistance. The interaction effect remains valid after controlling for other

factors that may affect the valuation consequences of toehold acquisitions.


    We claim that the interaction effects suggest that it depends on the managerial

resistance whether the challenges to the managerial control rights contribute to the

shareholder value. Although the anticipation of takeover increases the voting premium,

it does not necessarily lead to an increase in the shareholder value for fear of value-

                                               26

## Page 28

destroying takeover defensive tactics such as the payment of greenmails. The negative

effect of the managerial resistance on the probability of control transfer is consistent

with the hypothesis that takeover defensive mechanisms such as poison pills and the

payment of greenmails result in significant wealth losses to target shareholders.




References

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Burkart, Mike, 1995, Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover Contests,
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Campbell, John Y., Andrew W. Lo, and A. Craig Mackinlay, 1997, The Econometrics of
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Choi, Dosoung, 1991, Toehold Acquisitions, Shareholder Wealth, and the Market for
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DeAngelo, Harry and Linda DeAngelo, 1985, Managerial Ownership of Voting Rights:
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## Page 29

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                                           28

